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ABSTRACT 
Shareholder proposals attract attention from scholars in finance and 
economics because they present an opportunity to study both quasi-
democratic decision-making at the corporate level and the impact of this 
decision-making on firm outcomes. These studies capture the effect of 
various proposals but rarely address whether regulations should allow 
many of them in the first place due to the possibility of stock price 
manipulation. Recent changes to shareholder proposal rules, adopted in 
September 2020, sought to address the potential for exploitation that some 
proposals create (but ultimately failed to do so). This Article shows the 
potential for apparently legal stock price manipulation if shareholder 
proposals remain relatively unregulated. We propose improvements to 
decrease this risk of stock price manipulation, which should help the 
government prosecute the offenders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Holding stock in most corporations trading on American exchanges 
entitles the holder to certain rights.1 Those rights include voting for board 
members, voting on proposals for corporate governance changes, and 
submitting proposals for a shareholder vote.2 This third right is of 
particular interest because its exercise can bring the shareholder closer to 
direct corporate governance than the other rights.3 Rather than selecting a 
board member to act on the shareholder’s behalf, or voting on a measure 
proposed by others, the shareholder can actually propose changes to the 
 
 1. See generally Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 407 (2006); HOLGER SPAMANN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, CORPORATIONS 43–60 (2018); 
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 
651, 657 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 2. See generally Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
605 (2007); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1; Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439; Blasius, 564 A.2d at 
657. 
 3. See generally CAM HOANG, GARY TYGESSON & VIOLET RICHARDSON, SHAREHOLDER 
PROPOSALS: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (2016), https://www.dorsey.com 
/~/media/files/newsresources/events/2016/10/shareholder-proposals---powerpoint-presentation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3NB-9TZG]. 
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corporation’s business practices that others can approve.4 Whether these 
proposals harm or benefit corporations has been a subject of much debate 
in finance and economics, with several scholars suggesting that 
shareholder proposals are harmful.5 Despite these findings, we are 
unaware of any publications in law, finance, or economics that address 
potential remedies for shareholder proposals designed to harm the firm: 
our Article fills this gap in the literature. 
The plausibility that shareholder proposals can harm a corporation 
has many implications. First, this might mean that even well-meaning 
shareholders should leave firm governance to board members and the 
executive team those board members select. Second, these findings 
suggest that investors respond negatively when receiving news of a 
proposal, which institutional investors corroborate by frequently opposing 
proposals not made by the board of directors or management team.6 Third, 
and most alarmingly, the limitations on who might make these proposals 
are remarkably few.7 The proponent must prove essentially three elements: 
 
 4. See generally Id.; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1. See also Schnell, 285 A.2d at 
439; Blasius, 564 A.2d at 652–57. 
 5. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 833 (2005), with John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Can Shareholder 
Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions (Marshall Sch. of Bus. 
Working Paper, Paper No. 17-7, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881408 [https://perma.cc/6K2A-
9ZKF] [hereinafter Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals], and John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & 
Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 3215, 3215 (2019) 
[hereinafter Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals], and John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, A 
Theory of Shareholder Approval and Proposal Rights, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 377, 377 (2017) 
[hereinafter Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval]; Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, The 
Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943, 1943 (2012). 
See also Matthew R. Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria B. McWilliams, Thirty Years of 
Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405, 405 (2017). 
 6. See Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 2. 
 7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); see also Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Statement by Chairman Clayton on Modernizing the Shareholder Proposal Framework for the  
Benefit of All Shareholders (Sept. 24, 2020) (transcript available at HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/24/statement-by-chairman-clayton-on-
modernizing-the-shareholder-proposal-framework-for-the-benefit-of-all-shareholders/ 
[https://perma.cc/5SUT-79C4]; Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
by Commissioner Lee on the Amendments to Rule 14a-8 (Sept. 24, 2020) (transcript available at 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/24/statement-
by-commissioner-lee-on-the-amendments-to-rule-14a-8/ [https://perma.cc/8AVN-RJND]; Elad L. 
Roisman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by Commissioner Roisman on Procedural 
Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 (Sept. 24, 2020) 
(transcript available at HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/24/statement-by-commissioner-roisman-on-procedural-
requirements-and-resubmission-thresholds-under-exchange-act-rule-14a-8 [https://perma.cc/YV5K-
W3NH]; Marc A. Leaf & Sarah M. Bartlett, Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, FAEGRE 
DRINKER (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2020/9/ 
amendments-to-exchange-act-rule-14a-8 [https://perma.cc/3664-MCRU]. 
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they own either at least $2,000 worth of company shares or 1% or more of 
company shares, they owned these shares in excess of three years (or one 
year, if the individual holds $25,000 of company stock), and they intend 
to hold these shares indefinitely.8 Of course, the last element is remarkably 
hard to disprove, and even if a shareholder later sells their shares,  
the shareholder can simply claim that they changed their mind about  
their intent to hold the shares at some point after filing the  
shareholder proposal.9  
Why is this relevant? Why should shareholders be limited in 
exercising their right to govern the corporation directly? The answer is 
simple: Not every shareholder’s priority is the success of the company. 
The opportunity to manipulate stock prices could be more lucrative  
for some shareholders than merely drawing dividends or growing their 
wealth through capital gains, as current rules do not eliminate  
the plausibility that some investors may hold both a long and a short 
position in the same security. Where the short exposure exceeds the long 
exposure, it would be more beneficial for the shareholder that the company 
experience a bout of “bad luck”—and when the shareholder can cause  
the “bad luck” by making unwise proposals that may lower company 
value,10 the potential for price manipulation increases and should be 
countervailed by regulation.11  
To illustrate, imagine a shareholder holds $2,000 of Apple Inc. 
(ticker symbol AAPL) stock in a Fidelity brokerage account, which they 
have owned for the time necessary to submit a shareholder proposal.12 
Simultaneously, the shareholder holds a $100,000 short position in the 
same company in a Charles Schwab account. This shareholder can satisfy 
the requirements necessary to submit a proposal to the company.  
Then, the shareholder might submit a proposal deliberately intended to 
harm the company, knowing that the proposal may lower the stock price 
and increase the value of their short position much more than decrease  
the value of their long position. Alarmingly, the current rules do not 
 
 8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
 9. There is nothing in the statute forbidding shareholders from changing their mind about holding 
the shares after filing the shareholder proposal. See id. 
 10. Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 3; Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, 
supra note 5, at 3256–57; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5, at 398, 408. 
 11. We suggest regulation rather than free market solutions because government has already 
entered the field. If government agencies and taxpayer dollars are already being diverted to pay for 
government regulation, we might as well ensure that the government regulates efficiently. 
 12. The necessary time to cast such a proposal with $2,000 or more in securities is actively 
changing, so let us assume that the shareholder has met the long-term holding requirements, whatever 
those requirements are. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). See generally Clayton, supra note 7; Lee, supra 
note 7; Roisman, supra note 7; Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7. 
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prohibit this action.13 While the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has recently released alterations to its rules that  
might make transactions like this more cumbersome, the difficulty of 
benefitting from an intentionally harmful shareholder proposal is not 
greatly increased.14 
Part I of this Article outlines the laws, rules, and regulations 
governing shareholder proposals and the litigation surrounding them. We 
discuss how lenient the regulation on shareholder proposals is compared 
to the statutory, regulatory, and common law restrictions on what other 
stakeholders may and may not do when governing or interacting with the 
corporation. Part II of this Article surveys the economic and financial 
literature, discussing the effects of shareholder proposals on firm value. In 
Part III, this Article argues for additional regulation that would reduce the 
possibility of intentionally harmful shareholder proposals and aid in their 
detection. This Article concludes by demonstrating that excluding 
intentionally harmful proposals will likely reduce firm litigation costs, 
increase the chances that future proposals will increase firm value, and 
punish nefarious activities by shareholders not acting in good faith. 
I. LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The laws, rules, and regulations governing shareholder relations with 
the companies in which they hold stock arise out of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.15 The laws, rules, and regulations governing the conduct of 
board members, executives, and majority shareholders generally arise 
from common law principles, state and federal statutes, and state and 
federal regulations.16 State statutes and case law regarding stock 
ownership and company incorporation do exist, but the primary guidance 
for investors comes from the United States Congress and the 
administrative agencies Congress created to oversee security trading: 
primarily the SEC.17 Congress sometimes alters laws governing securities 
trading and corporation management, such as when it passed the Dodd-
 
 13. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
 14. See generally Clayton, supra note 7; Lee, supra note 7; Roisman, supra note 7; Leaf & 
Bartlett, supra note 7. 
 15. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
 16. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8; cf. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 
A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch. 1988); Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 
1955). 
 17. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/about/what-
we-do [https://perma.cc/S8Y7-8CRK]. 
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Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.18 However, the bulk of regulatory 
and enforcement authority falls to the SEC.19  
A. Overview of Corporate Governance 
We begin via an overview of corporate governance law to 
demonstrate precisely where shareholder proposals fall in the grand 
scheme of running a publicly traded corporation under United States law. 
Shareholder proposals are hardly the main governance mechanisms 
through which shareholders exercise control over their corporation; that is 
part of why it is so surprising that the impact of these proposals can be felt 
distinctly in firm stock prices. Nevertheless, shareholder proposals are 
among the few direct ways that shareholders can influence the governance 
of a corporation—ordinarily, they can only act through their elected 
representatives on the board of directors. The empirical findings show that 
this direct form of shareholder democracy can have a negative effect.20 
Given the heavy regulations otherwise imposed upon corporate leadership 
that we will discuss in this section,21 it would be inconsistent not to extend 
similar regulations to activities by “activist” shareholders that can result 
in stock price manipulation. 
1. Officers, Directors, and Shareholders 
All corporations have one or more directors, one or more officers, 
and one or more shareholders.22 When a company has multiple directors, 
they act as a group, known as a board of directors, which is the 
corporation’s governing body.23 Directors appoint and supervise the 
officers who run the corporation’s daily operations.24 It is through 
directors that shareholders usually exercise control over the corporation in 
which they hold shares: by electing the directors that most closely align 
 
 18. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002); Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, STEMBER COHN & DAVIDSON-WELLING, https://stember 
cohn.com/practice-areas/employment-law-2/sarbanes-oxley-and-dodd-frank-whistleblower 
[https://perma.cc/FN8H-SU8B]. 
 19. What We Do, supra note 17. 
 20. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic 
Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5. 
 21. See generally SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1. See also Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439; 
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 654; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 721; Perlman, 219 F.2d at 175. 
 22. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8. 
 23. Id. at 8; see also Powers & Duties of Corporation Directors & Officers, WOLTERS KLUWER 
(2019), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-insights/powers-and-duties-of-corporation-
directors-and-officers [https://perma.cc/N7AF-K523] [hereinafter Powers & Duties]. 
 24. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 8. 
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with their own interest in a type of representative democratic system.25 
Typically, directors are responsible for making major business decisions 
and advising officers, whereas the officers are responsible for day-to-day 
decisions and implementing the board of directors’ policies.26 
Major business decisions that directors are typically responsible for 
(and which can result in their liability) include fixing executive 
compensation, pensions, retirement, and other compensation plans; 
deciding if and when dividends should be declared; and proposing special 
corporate matters, such as amendments to the articles of incorporation, 
mergers, asset and stock sales, and dissolutions, to the corporation’s 
shareholders.27 Directors generally cannot take certain actions, including 
amending the corporation’s articles of incorporation or sales of almost all 
of the corporation’s assets, without first obtaining shareholder approval.28 
Less important decisions, though, need not be approved by shareholders. 
In the event the board’s conduct does not coincide with shareholder 
preferences, the shareholders’ remedy is simply to elect new directors. 
Company officers have very similar duties to directors, excluding, of 
course, facing liability for setting officer compensation (unless the 
executive is also the board member who votes for his own excessive 
compensation).29 
A shareholder is an individual who or entity that owns shares in a 
corporation.30 Shareholders can be split into two types based on the types 
of shares they hold: (i) common shareholders, who own shares of the 
corporation’s common stock, and (ii) preferred shareholders, who own 
shares of the corporation’s preferred stock (if the company has issued any 
preferred stock at all).31 Common shareholders are the most prevalent type 
 
 25. See generally Powers & Duties, supra note 23. 
 26. Id.; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8; In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 53–54 (Del. 2006); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 
(Del. 1983); In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 889 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 27. Powers & Duties, supra note 23; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8; 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 53–54; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710–11; In re 
Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d at 889. 
 28. Powers & Duties, supra note 23; see, e.g., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 
642 (Del. 2014), overruled by Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018); Glassman v. 
Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–
141, 194–312. 
 29. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch. 
1988); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 
173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 30. What Is a Shareholder?, CORP. FIN. INST. (2020), https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/ 
resources/knowledge/finance/shareholder/ [https://perma.cc/N6EY-TNZZ]; see also SPAMANN & 
SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8, 43–60. 
 31. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11, 
at 47. 
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of shareholder and typically have the right to vote on matters concerning 
the corporation, including electing directors.32 In contrast, preferred 
shareholders typically have no voting rights.33 However, preferred 
shareholders are paid dividends prior to common stockholders and have a 
preferred claim to company assets at dissolution, superior to that of the 
common stockholders.34 Majority shareholders usually have fiduciary 
duties similar to those imposed on directors and officers, but minority 
shareholders share no such responsibilities.35 
2. Governing Law 
Generally, the state law (where the business incorporates) governs 
that corporation’s governance activities.36 More than half of the  
publicly traded companies on United States stock exchanges are 
incorporated in Delaware.37 Moreover, approximately two-thirds of 
Fortune 500 companies, including Apple Inc. and The Coca-Cola 
Company, have chosen Delaware as their state of incorporation.38 
Delaware has been the predominant choice for corporations since the early 
1900s.39 There are several reasons why Delaware dominates other states 
in this respect.40 The Delaware General Corporation Law, which governs 
the corporations that incorporate within the state, is one of the most 
“advanced and flexible” corporation statutes in America.41 Perhaps most 
importantly, however, many corporations choose Delaware due to the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, a non-jury trial court, which serves as 
Delaware’s court of original and exclusive equity jurisdiction and 
 
 32. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11, 
at 47. 
 33. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11, 
at 47. 
 34. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11, 
at 47. 
 35. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955); In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder 
Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983). 
 36. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also State of Incorporation: 
Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/state-of-incorporation 
[https://perma.cc/FHM4-4ELU]. 
 37. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Alana Semuels, The Tiny 
State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-governance/502487 
[https://perma.cc/N2GF-5Z7A]. 
 38. Semuels, supra note 37; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 39. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8. See generally LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., 
WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE (Del. Dep’t of State 2007). 
 40. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 41. BLACK, supra note 39, at 1; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
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adjudicates, among others, corporate law cases.42 Five justices—some of 
the country’s most renowned experts in corporate law—serve on the 
Delaware Court of Chancery.43 
3. Fiduciary Duties 
In this backdrop of corporate law, lawyers, and policymakers can 
find many requirements imposed on members of a corporation.44 These 
requirements are well-tailored to optimize corporate performance, and we 
draw our inspiration for additional regulations on shareholder activism 
from the existence of these requirements.45 In almost any context, the duty 
of care, the duty of loyalty, and additional statutory and regulatory 
authority govern the conduct of key figures in a corporation, including 
majority shareholders.46 Yet, one exception to that rule is shareholder 
activism: When it comes to shareholder proposals, these duties, or any 
rules similar thereto, have yet to be applied.47 We will describe the duties 
and legal regulations that place boundaries on the conduct of majority 
shareholders, board members, and corporate officers and suggest that the 
same spirit that gives rise to these restraints on corporate conduct48 should 
lead us to restrain shareholder activism designed to harm rather than 
benefit the corporation. 
i. Officers and Directors 
Directors of corporations have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.49 
Executives, board members, and, in some cases, majority shareholders 
owe these duties to the corporation and its stockholders (though this 
 
 42. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Semuels, supra note 37, at 
5–7. 
 43. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Semuels, supra note 37, at 
5–7. 
 44. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 
1. See also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439–40 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas 
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 
1971). 
 45. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021). See also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, 
supra note 1, at 61–141; Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009); Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (1985). 
 46. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439–40; 
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 719–20; Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 
F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021). 
 47. See, e.g., C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2021); Clayton, supra note 7; Lee, supra note 7; Roisman, 
supra note 7; Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7. 
 48. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439–
40; Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 719; Perlman, 219 F.2d at 176. 
See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021). 
 49. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 
A.2d at 239; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Smith, 488 A.2d at 872. 
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section will focus primarily on the duties of executives and board 
members).50 Violation of these duties can lead to direct or derivative 
lawsuits by stockholders on behalf of themselves, the corporation, or 
both.51 In a dissolution or insolvency context, duties may be owed to 
creditors, as residual claimants of value, as well.52 The fiduciary duty of 
care requires that directors keep themselves reasonably informed when 
making decisions on behalf of the corporation and make those decisions 
in good faith.53 The fiduciary duty of loyalty requires a director to act in 
good faith and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.54 These duties alone 
have attracted a tremendous amount of litigation and regulation—a quality 
apparently unshared by shareholder proposals and the responsibilities of 
those who submit them.55 Under the current law, something as basic as the 
duty of good faith would not apply to a minority shareholder who 
deliberately proposes a harmful proposal, even though this would be a 
crucial element in determining liability of directors, executives, and even 
majority shareholders (where applicable).56 While some provisions of 
Delaware law permit these duties to be somewhat restricted via 
modifications to a company’s certificate of incorporation,57 there are 
ample examples where no such abrogation occurred and directors faced 
liability for their actions.58 
 
 50. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439–
40; Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 719; Perlman, 219 F.2d at 176. 
 51. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 
A.2d at 239; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Smith, 488 A.2d at 872. 
 52. See, e.g., Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Gershen, No. 11116-VCS, 2016 WL 5462958, at *42 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2016). 
 53. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 873; 
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 53 (Del. 2006); Stone ex rel. AmSouth 
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 54. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82; see also Ivanhoe Partners v. 
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Del. 1987); Blasius, 564 A.2d at 657; Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 55. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 
A.2d at 237; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; Smith, 488 A.2d at 864; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 906 A.2d at 46. 
 56. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82; Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341; Blasius 
Indus., 564 A.2d at 662–63; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510. 
 57. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (West 2021). See generally Lyondell Chem. Co., 970 
A.2d 235 (discussing provisions indemnifying and holding harmless directors for any alleged breaches 
of the fiduciary duty of care but not the duty of loyalty). 
 58. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 662–64; Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971). 
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a. The Fiduciary Duty of Care 
The fiduciary duty of care requires a director to be informed of all 
material information reasonably available before making a business 
decision.59 The director, executive, or majority shareholder must act with 
the level of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would use 
in their position under similar circumstances.60 According to the American 
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance, the fiduciary duty of 
a director is as follows: 
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the 
director’s or officer’s functions: in good faith; in a manner that he or 
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation; 
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably 
be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar 
circumstances.61 
In reviewing whether an individual bound by the duty has satisfied 
it, courts have looked at the information available to a director and the 
process followed by the board in reaching its decisions.62 
In evaluating a director’s actions under the duty of care standard, 
courts apply the “business judgment rule” when directors act with the 
requisite knowledge, employ due consideration when reaching a decision, 
and otherwise meet the elements necessary to justify the rule’s 
application.63 Under the business judgment rule, courts will presume that 
disinterested directors have made decisions on an informed basis with a 
good faith belief that the decisions are in the best interests of the 
corporation.64 The American Law Institute provides the following 
definition of the business judgment rule in its Principles of Corporate 
Governance: 
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith 
fulfills the duty under this section if the director or officer: (1) is not 
interested in the subject of the business judgment; (2) is informed 
with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent that 
 
 59. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 872; 
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 652; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510. 
 60. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 872; 
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 652; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510. 
 61. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (AM. L. INST. 2020). 
 62. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 874; 
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 659; Guth, 5 A.2d at 515. 
 63. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984); Smith, 488 A.2d at 872–73; Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 
1350 (Del. 1985). 
 64. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 
811; Smith, 488 A.2d at 871; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350. 
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the director or officer reasonably believes is appropriate under the 
circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the business judgment 
is in the best interests of the corporation.65 
Individuals challenging board decisions can rebut this presumption 
by demonstrating that the directors were grossly negligent in their 
decision-making and thus in violation of their duty of care.66 In Smith v. 
Van Gorkom, a seemingly earth-shattering case of business organizations 
law, the Delaware Supreme Court held that even very experienced 
directors who sold their company shares at a $20 premium over the market 
price could be held liable because they decided to sell too quickly for the 
court’s preference and without viewing enough studies of value.67 While 
this was certainly the exception to the principle that the reasonable 
business judgment rule ordinarily shields directors from liability, it 
reminds us that even under apparently beneficial circumstances for the 
shareholders (such as the $20 premium over market price), directors can 
face liability for taking insufficient time to study company valuations or 
to consider the impact of their actions on shareholders.68 We are aware of 
no case even remotely similar that imposes a duty on an activist submitting 
a shareholder proposal. Individuals submitting such proposals need not 
even seek the protection of the business judgment rule because the 
fiduciary duty of care under which the rule applies does not extend to 
shareholder activists. 
A counterargument can be sustained that the business judgment rule 
ordinarily protects directors, executives, and majority shareholders and 
leads to a dismissal of most litigation.69 This would mean that the litigation 
threats these individuals actually face are not much greater than minority 
shareholder proponents of ill-advised proposals.70 After all, the outcome 
observed in Smith v. Van Gorkom is the exception that proves the rule.71 
Under the business judgment rule, courts focus on the leadership’s process 
in making a decision rather than the outcome of the decision, which 
permits almost any choice made by leadership to withstand scrutiny as 
long as the process of reaching it does not greatly offend the court.72 In 
 
 65. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 61, § 4.01(c). 
 66. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 
811; Smith, 488 A.2d at 884. 
 67. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 874; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–107. 
 68. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 
812; Smith, 488 A.2d at 890. 
 69. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 
818; Smith, 488 A.2d at 893; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006). 
 70. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 
818; Smith, 488 A.2d at 893; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 75. 
 71. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 888; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141. 
 72. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141. 
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determining whether a defendant satisfied their fiduciary duty of care, a 
court will generally give deference to the defendant and will not substitute 
its own judgment for the defendant’s, even if a decision turned out to be 
unwise, so long as the decider acted on an informed basis, in good faith, 
and in the rational belief that the decision made was in the best interests of 
the company and its stockholders.73 
If the plaintiff fails to rebut the business judgment rule presumption 
and cannot demonstrate a breach of a fiduciary duty, the plaintiff will not 
be entitled to a remedy (and the defendant will not be subject to reprimand) 
unless the challenged transaction constitutes waste.74 To recover on a 
claim of waste, a plaintiff must prove that the relevant exchange was “so 
one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could 
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”75 This 
standard is stringent, and the plaintiff can only prove waste occurred in the 
“rare, ‘unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or give 
away corporate assets.’”76 However, recovery is still technically possible, 
though not against shareholders deliberately submitting proposals that 
would squander corporate assets. 
Delaware directors also owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure as part of 
their duty of care.77 The fiduciary duty of disclosure requires directors to 
disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board’s control 
when it seeks shareholder action.78 Directors further owe a fiduciary duty 
of candor, also part of their duty of care.79 The duty of candor requires 
directors to communicate honestly and to make full and fair disclosures to 
their fellow directors and the corporation’s stockholders of all information 
known to them that is relevant to the decision under consideration.80 
Moreover, directors, executives, and other individuals owing fiduciary 
 
 73. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 52; Stone 
ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); Moran v. Household Int’l, 
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985); see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141. 
 74. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 74; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, 
supra note 1, at 83–141. 
 75. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 74; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra 
note 1, at 83–141. 
 76. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 74 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 
244, 263 (Del. 2000)); see SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141. 
 77. See Chatham Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Papanier, No. 2017-0088-AGB, 2017 WL 6550428, at 
*9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2017). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See generally Steven Smith, Duties and Liabilities of Boards of Directors, BUCHANAN LABS 
(July 2, 2015), http://buchanan-labs.com/duties-and-liabilities-of-boards-of-directors-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/VUE3-F6MQ]. 
 80. See id. 
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duties to the corporation cannot trade on insider information.81 The duty 
of candid disclosure of such information to the public prior to trading on 
it forms the very basis of American insider trading regulations.82 We are, 
once again, unaware of any such impositions of duty on proponents of 
activist shareholder proposals that promote drastic changes in the way a 
particular publicly traded corporation does business, even if the business 
of the corporation is generally good in its unaltered state. 
b. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty 
Another duty not extended to activist minority shareholders is the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.83 This 
obligation is crucial in preventing majority shareholders, executives, and 
board members from proposing actions deliberately harmful to a 
corporation due to some potential benefit that might accrue to the activist 
shareholder.84 Ordinarily, this duty might prevent a parent corporation 
from taking advantage of its subsidiary by engaging in dealings that  
would be overly beneficial to the owner company and detrimental  
to the shareholders.85 In the same spirit, this duty, if applied to proponents 
of harmful proposals, would be remarkably helpful in preventing 
individuals from shorting the same company to which they submit 
unhelpful ideas. Nevertheless, no such duty appears to apply to minority 
shareholder activists, although it applies to majority shareholders, officers, 
directors, and corporations that hold a particular company as a subsidiary 
of their own.86 
The duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing by requiring officers, 
directors, and majority shareholders to act in good faith and in a manner 
they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation and 
its stockholders.87 An executive’s, board member’s, or majority 
shareholder’s own financial or other self-interest may not take priority 
over the interests of the corporation and its stockholders when these 
 
 81. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 
646, 651 (1983). 
 82. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651. 
 83. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987); see also 
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 
(Del. 1939); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 84. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Guth, 5 
A.2d at 510; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 85. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Guth, 5 
A.2d at 510; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 86. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Guth, 5 
A.2d at 510; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 87. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 657; SPAMANN 
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
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individuals make decisions on behalf of the corporation.88 The director 
also has an obligation to act in good faith in the oversight of the 
corporation.89 Perhaps the most important aspect of the duty of loyalty is 
the difficulty of mounting a business judgment rule defense—the most 
popular defensive mechanism available to parties sued in the corporate 
context under a breach of fiduciary duty.90 While amply available to 
defendants in lawsuits arising from an alleged breach of the duty of care, 
this rule becomes much more inaccessible when the suit arises from an 
alleged breach of the duty of loyalty.91 That is because a director’s duty of 
loyalty is commonly challenged in connection with conflicts of interest 
and corporate opportunities, as described below.92 
1. Conflicts of Interest 
A conflict of interest may exist when a member of company 
leadership has a direct or indirect personal or financial interest in a 
transaction or other matter involving the corporation.93 Individuals who 
have a duty of loyalty to the corporation should promptly disclose potential 
conflicts of interest to the board and describe all material facts concerning 
the transaction or other matters that are known to the conflicted 
individual.94 Following disclosure, an interested individual should not 
decide on the matter that involves the conflict of interest.95 In some 
situations, the conflicted individual must refrain from participating in 
discussions or excuse themselves from meetings during the discussion.96 
A majority of disinterested directors should approve transactions that 
present conflicts of interest after full disclosure of all material information 
regarding the transaction and the nature of the conflicted individual’s 
 
 88. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 657; SPAMANN 
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 89. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 657; SPAMANN 
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 90. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 809 (Del. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1975). 
 91. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Matthew Gensburg, The 
Business Judgment Rule and Its Limits and Exceptions, GENSBURG CALANDRIELLO & KANTER, P.C. 
(May 22, 2018), https://www.gcklegal.com/business-judgment-rule-limits-exceptions [https:// 
perma.cc/8TPV-FKAK]. 
 92. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at 
814; Smith, 488 A.2d at 865. 
 93. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1989); Guth v. Loft, 
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939); see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 94. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1280; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra 
note 1, at 61–82. 
 95. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1282; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra 
note 1, at 61–82. 
 96. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1282. see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra 
note 1, at 61–82. 
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interest in the transaction.97 Conflicted members of corporate leadership 
have a duty to disclose to the board material information in their 
possession affecting a board decision, especially where the conflicted 
individuals have a personal interest in the outcome of the decision.98 
Coincidentally, a conflict of interest may remove the protections of 
the business judgment rule.99 The business judgment rule does not apply 
if invoked by an interested fiduciary. Hence, if the allegations of a duty of 
loyalty violation come in connection with some personal interest that the 
accused could advance by acting inappropriately, then the business 
judgment rule defense may be altogether unavailable.100 The potential 
unavailability of the business judgment rule is why conflicts of interest 
pose significant problems for members of company leadership despite 
posing no problem for proponents of bad corporate policy who submit 
shareholder proposals. Under the current rules, individuals who seek the 
company’s demise face no liability for submitting proposals that might 
lead to its demise as long as the proponent is not part of the corporate 
leadership team. 
2. Corporate Opportunities 
The duty of loyalty generally requires that if a director gains access 
to a corporate opportunity related to the corporation’s business, the 
director must first make that opportunity available to the corporation 
before pursuing it on their own behalf.101 Directors should consider the 
following factors when deciding whether a potential business transaction 
is a corporate opportunity: (i) the relevance of the opportunity to the 
corporation’s existing or proposed business; (ii) the context in which the 
director became aware of the opportunity; (iii) the possible impact of the 
opportunity on the corporation and the level of interest of the corporation 
in the opportunity; and (iv) the reasonableness of any corporate 
expectation that the director should present the opportunity to the 
corporation.102 If an individual subject to the duty of loyalty presents the 
opportunity to the board and the disinterested directors disclaim interest in 
 
 97. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1280; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra 
note 1, at 61–82. 
 98. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1280; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra 
note 1, at 61–82. 
 99. See Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719, 725–56 (7th Cir. 2013); 
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001); see also Gensburg, supra note 91. 
 100. See Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret. Sys., 727 F.3d at 726; Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 
91; see also Gensburg, supra note 91. 
 101. See J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 156 A.2d 499, 502 (Del. 1959); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 
(Del. 1986). 
 102. See Guth, 5 A.2d at 511. 
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the opportunity, the interested individual may generally pursue the 
opportunity on their own behalf.103 Board members are subject to the same 
fiduciary duties as are officers, and the duty may extend to majority 
shareholders as well.104 
Take the case of Guth v. Loft, Inc. as an important example.105 The 
case discusses what is now a historic event of the transfer of rights to 
Pepsi-Cola.106 Guth, the president of Loft, received an offer in his capacity 
to purchase Pepsi-Cola as a replacement for a deal Loft had with Coca-
Cola.107 Guth saw the benefit in the transaction and the future proceeds of 
Pepsi-Cola through its business with Loft108 and purchased Pepsi-Cola for 
himself rather than on behalf of his company.109 Because Guth violated his 
duty of loyalty and engaged in beneficial self-dealing as opposed to 
bringing the offer to his company, the court forced him to turn over his 
shares of Pepsi-Cola to Loft and any profits otherwise gained from the 
transaction with Pepsi-Cola.110 
A similar duty, however, does not exist for minority shareholders 
who file proposals to change a company’s manner of business. Such 
shareholders can, at least in theory, ask the corporation to engage in 
business dealings that would forego valuable business opportunities for 
that corporation, but that might create those same opportunities for the 
proponents of the proposal. For example, proposals to engage in more 
carbon-neutral processes for the manufacture of products, if adopted, 
would undoubtedly aid businesses that specialize in producing 
manufacturing equipment that has a low carbon footprint. Does it make 
sense to permit members of the benefitting industry to purchase shares in 
certain companies and then make proposals that those companies engage 
them in one-sided business ventures? One might argue that this would 
breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty if done by a director or manager of the 
non-benefitting company,111 but because minority shareholders have no 
such duty, they can make these proposals to their hearts’ (and wallets’) 
content. In fact, if they are clever, they may submit the shareholder 
proposals in ways that are not obviously affiliated with their carbon-
neutral-manufacturing-equipment business, hence removing suspicion in 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. See generally Powers & Duties, supra note 23. 
 105. Guth, 5 A.2d 503. 
 106. Id. at 506. 
 107. Id. at 506–07. 
 108. Id. at 506. 
 109. Id. at 507–08. 
 110. Id. at 508. 
 111. E.g., id. at 511; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
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the eyes of the retail shareholder (and perhaps even the “smart money” 
shareholder) that the proponent is up to no good. 
ii. Shareholders 
In contrast to the broad fiduciary duties owed by directors and 
officers, shareholders only owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and 
other shareholders if they are deemed a “controlling” shareholder.112 
However, this is not a trivial imposition for majority shareholders, as they 
can frequently face lawsuits similar to the ones levied against executives 
and directors for a breach of a fiduciary duty.113 Nevertheless, unlike some 
states, Delaware does not impose on controlling shareholders (and their 
representatives in management) a “heightened” fiduciary duty.114 When 
the “heightened” duty applies—in certain other states and in the Delaware 
limited liability context—it requires the controlling shareholders to share 
pro rata with the minority all corporate benefits.115 A controlling 
shareholder is a shareholder who holds at least 50% of the corporation’s 
shares and exercises actual control under Delaware law, but this concept 
may soon evolve to include shareholders who control a sufficiently large 
block of a corporation to be able to control its operations.116 
Because minority shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation or the other shareholders, minority shareholders may act in 
self-serving ways thus harming the corporation.117 However, this risk has 
generally “attracted little attention for two [main] reasons.”118 First, 
minority shareholders historically “played a largely passive role” in public 
corporations.119 Second, the common belief is that the shareholder’s 
“primary goal is to improve the [corporation’s] overall economic 
performance.”120 After all, this is usually the way the shareholder profits 
from owning a company’s shares: by a rise in its stock price and dividend 
payouts that will manifest themselves into dividend and capital gains for 
 
 112. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 
F.2d 173, 177 (2d Cir. 1955); In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232, 
at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012). 
 113. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987); Blasius 
Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988); Guth, 5 A.2d at 510; see also SPAMANN & 
SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82. 
 114. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1373 (Del. 1993). 
 115. Id. at 1371. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1257 (2008). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1258. 
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that shareholder. As discussed in this Article, these assumptions no longer 
hold true in certain scenarios.121 
B. Overview of Short-Selling 
A traditional short sale occurs when an investor sells stock that the 
investor does not yet own or when a sale is consummated by delivering 
stock borrowed by, or for the account of, the investor.122 The investor later 
closes out the short position by returning the borrowed security to the stock 
lender, usually by purchasing securities on the open market.123 Investors 
selling short-stock believe the stock’s price will fall, hoping to purchase 
the stock at a lower price, return the stock to the lender, and make a profit 
on the difference between the price of stock sale and the price of stock 
repurchase and return.124 If the price of the stock instead increases, the 
short seller seeking to terminate their position would purchase the stock at 
the higher price and will incur a loss.125 This loss occurs because the price 
of selling the borrowed stock was lower than the price paid upon 
repurchase and return of the borrowed shares. Therefore, the short seller 
profits when the share price decreases between the investor’s sale and 
subsequent repurchase, thus generating a potential incentive for security 
price manipulation to the downside.126 
There are other ways to short securities that do not require borrowing 
and selling shares.127 Investors could sell call options by writing the option 
themselves and conveying the option to a willing buyer.128 A call option 
entitles the buyer to purchase the stock at the previously agreed strike price 
from the writer of the option.129 The option locks in the price, so no matter 
how high or low the price of the underlying security goes, the individual 
holding the option can buy that stock at the strike price.130 The writer of 
the call option, on the other hand, must convey the stock at the strike price 
even if the actual price of the security is higher.131 Hence, the individual 
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 122. Short Sales, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm 
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writing the call option has a short position, because they are counting on 
the stock price to fall or remain below the strike price, and the buyer of the 
call option has a long position, because they have the right (but not the 
obligation) to purchase the underlying security.132 Needless to say,  
options are only valuable so long as the stock price is actually above the 
strike price of the option.133 Otherwise, the option holder can simply 
purchase the stock for less on the open market and allow the option 
contract to expire.134 
Similar to shorting stocks through a derivative call option, the 
investor can also achieve the same or similar result through put options.135 
While a call option entitles the buyer to buy at a price that the parties 
previously agreed to, a put option entitles the buyer to sell at a price the 
parties previously agreed to.136 These options function in the opposite 
direction of a call option.137 While a call option entitles the holder to 
purchase shares of stock from the writer at the strike price, the put option 
entitles the holder to sell shares of stock to the writer at the strike price.138 
Hence, an individual wishing to bet against a stock may purchase several 
put options at a particular strike price.139 Then, when the stock suffers a 
decline below the stock price, the right to sell that stock above its new low 
price suddenly becomes valuable and marketable to holders of that 
security.140 The holder of the put option can then sell it to individuals 
(basically as an insurance policy against stock declines), and those 
individuals can cash in on the put and force the writer to pay the strike 
price for shares that are far less expensive on the open market.141 This is 
somewhat akin to selling home insurance for a home that has already 
caught fire: The seller can command a very high price.142 
There are a number of other creative ways investors can short 
securities, but the concept is largely the same, and we do not wish to 
exhaust the reader by listing every one. What is important to note is that 
shorting a stock is not always lucrative for the short-sellers because 
obvious risks exist.143 The potential for severe losses if a stock’s price goes 
up after the short sale creates an additional incentive for the short seller to 
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manipulate stock prices downward because a short sale might expose them 
to potentially infinite liability if the price of the shorted security continues 
to rise in value before the trader can close their position.144 Brokerage 
firms generally lend stock to individuals engaging in short sales, using 
either the firm’s own inventory, the margin account of another firm’s 
customer, or another lender.145 Many brokerages will automatically close 
a short position after the investor has lost a sufficient amount of money for 
betting on a stock’s price to fall when the price actually rises (especially if 
the trader cannot honor a margin call).146 However, investors can still find 
themselves deeply in debt after an unsuccessful round of short selling.147 
Short selling is not without controversy.148 The biggest concern with 
short selling is its potential for market abuse.149 In 2008, for example, over 
the course of just one hour, the shares of HBOS plc, a banking and 
insurance company in the United Kingdom, dramatically declined when 
rumors abounded that the bank had significant financial problems.150 The 
rumors proved to be false, and the share price recovered later that day, but 
investors with short positions in HBOS shares made a significant profit.151 
There is widespread speculation that a hedge fund planted the rumors to 
make a quick buck.152 Shareholder proposals also have the potential to 
inspire price declines because markets may negatively view a corporation 
having to address a pesky proposal.153 Hence, shareholders that hold short 
positions in various firms but own sufficient securities to file shareholder 
proposals stand well-poised to profit from filing proposals calculated to 
reduce firm value. 
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C. The SEC and Shareholder Proposals 
The SEC, while created via laws passed by the legislative branch, 
operates as an independent regulatory agency of the United States 
government.154 The SEC investigates administrative, civil, and criminal 
misconduct involving market manipulation and works closely with the 
United States Attorneys to prosecute offenders.155 The SEC also has  
its own sets of rules and guidelines.156 Some of these guidelines can be 
found within the Code of Federal Regulations.157 Others can be found 
within the internal rules of the SEC.158 The Commission itself enforces the 
rules and guidelines that it sets forth, sometimes serving as an interested 
party and in other instances essentially arbitrating disputes between 
conflicting parties.159 
The SEC plays an important role in the relationship between 
shareholders and corporations.160 Part of the SEC’s task is to reduce 
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instances of foul play. For example, the agency monitors and curtails 
insider trading by collaborating with other investigative agencies such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.161 The SEC also helps ensure that 
investor voices reach the ears of corporate leadership.162 As holders of the 
corporation’s shares, stockholders should have at least some voice in the 
corporation’s operation if they so desire.163 To that extent, the SEC 
ordinarily requires that shareholder proposals receive company attention 
if the proposals comply with certain rules.164 Specifically, a proposal that 
complies with the rules must be included on the ballot for vote by other 
shareholders at the next shareholder meeting.165 Failure to include a 
compliant proposal from an investor not only subjects the corporation to a 
potential lawsuit from the rebuffed investor but also subjects the 
corporation to enforcement actions and penalties brought by the SEC.166 
The rules governing shareholder proposals originated in the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.167 This Act gave the SEC the authority 
to craft rules and requirements for the submission of shareholder 
proposals.168 The SEC did so in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8: Shareholder 
proposals (commonly known as Rule 14a-8).169 This rule, fashioned in a 
question-and-answer format, explains to the company and its shareholders 
the rules regarding the submission of various proposals that both sides 
must follow.170 Corporate attorneys frequently employ these rules to 
attempt to exclude shareholder proposals from consideration by pointing 
out to the SEC that the shareholder did not comply with one or more of the 
rules that the agency has promulgated for submission of such proposals.171 
As a result, the corporation will request that the SEC issue a “no-action 
letter,” which is a letter that confirms the SEC plans to take no action 
 
shareholder-proposals-no-action [https://perma.cc/9G95-KURT] [hereinafter 2019-2020 No-Action 
Responses]. 
 161. Insider Trading — Proactive Enforcement Paying Off, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
(Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/insider-trading [https://perma.cc/4JCW-FHNC]. 
 162. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2016 No-Action 
Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters, supra note 
160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note 160. 
 163. Bebchuk, supra note 5. 
 164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2016 No-Action 
Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters, supra note 
160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note 160. 
 165. Id. 
 166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
 167. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2020). 
 168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., 2016 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 
2018 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-
Action Responses, supra note 160. 
730 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 44:707 
against the company for excluding a particular proposal from the annual 
meeting materials and from a shareholder vote.172 
These letters are not technically binding on the SEC, and the 
shareholder can still pursue their own personal court action to require the 
proposal to receive a vote.173 However, when the SEC issues a no-action 
letter, it is typically the end of the discussion.174 Thousands of requests for 
no-action letters have been submitted to the SEC over the past two 
decades, and the SEC has usually sided with the corporations on whether 
a no-action letter would issue.175 However, a non-trivial number of cases 
have involved corporations losing their bid to exclude the proposal, 
leaving them the choice to either negotiate with the proponent to reach 
some settlement or to put the matter to a vote at the annual meeting.176 
Refusing to choose one of these options would open the corporation to  
an enforcement action not only by the shareholder but by the SEC as 
well—a path likely far more destructive than its alternative, and one that 
would still ultimately lead to the proposal receiving a vote at the annual 
shareholders’ meeting. 
As mentioned above, almost anyone who is truly interested in 
making a shareholder proposal to any company can do so: all the 
proponent would have to do is purchase at least $2,000 worth of company 
shares or 1% or more of company shares, hold the stock for at least three 
years,177 and then state their subjective intent at the time of the proposal to 
continue holding the security.178 That is, the investor could, theoretically, 
change their mind and sell the stock later regardless of their earlier implicit 
claim that they intended to hold the security indefinitely.179 The possibility 
of almost anyone submitting a proposal leaves publicly-traded companies 
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open to proposals from individuals who are just “passing through” without 
any significant stake in the company.180 Hence, the economic disincentives 
ordinarily present to dissuade poor behavior by shareholders are not 
necessarily effective in these cases. 
Currently, the SEC only receives a few hundred requests per year to 
permit exclusion of proposals.181 However, there are significantly more 
stockholders that could qualify as individuals with the right to make such 
proposals. If these shareholders began to submit proposal after proposal, 
it is entirely possible that both the SEC staff handling these no-action letter 
requests and the companies receiving them would become 
overwhelmed.182 Naturally, it may not be optimal for the shareholder to 
engage in such behavior, as they would effectively be participating in 
devaluing their own company.183 However, the window appears open for 
activists or nefarious actors to infiltrate the rank of company ownership 
and slow its legal operations.184 The fact that this has not taken place yet 
(at least not to a detectable degree) is quite surprising, especially because 
the current short-selling market allows investors to potentially profiteer off 
of a company’s woes. 
So far, without the unregulated influx of proposals from 
troublemakers, the SEC ordinarily receives and processes most no-action 
letters during the first part of the year.185 Generally, the process of 
submitting a proposal and battling with the corporation to ensure that the 
proposal appears on the ballot unfolds as follows: 
1. A shareholder conceives of a particular action that they wish the 
company to take or refrain from taking. These actions can 
include anything from reducing pollution and adopting corporate 
social responsibility policies to amending shareholder voting 
procedures.186 
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2. The shareholder drafts a proposal to that effect and submits it to 
the company prior to the annual meeting in hopes of having the 
proposal included for a vote by other shareholders.187 
3. The corporation decides its course of action. Because there is 
little evidence that corporate leadership views these proposals as 
helpful, as indicated by hundreds of no-action letter requests, the 
corporation seeks to essentially suppress the matter from coming 
to a vote by seeking a no-action letter from the SEC.188 In so 
doing, the company provides the SEC with the proposal it 
received and then cites reasons under Rule 14a-8 why the 
proposal violates SEC rules and should be excluded.189 
4. Sometimes, the shareholder responds (typically represented by a 
lawyer), arguing why the proposal does not violate guidelines 
and that it cannot be properly excluded.190 
5. The parties negotiate. While the filings arrive at the SEC, there 
is frequently quite a bit of action on the sidelines: the company 
and the shareholder engage in negotiations where the company 
sometimes offers concessions in exchange for the shareholder 
withdrawing their offer.191 It is even possible for company 
leadership to take some (but rarely all) steps to implement the 
shareholder proposal without requiring a vote at the annual 
meeting.192 
6. If the parties reach an agreement, they typically file a document 
with the SEC notifying agency attorneys that the SEC need not 
reach a conclusion regarding the no-action request.193 Instead, 
the attorneys are informed that the shareholder is withdrawing 
their proposal and the “case” should be closed.194 
7. In the alternative, when no agreement can be reached, the SEC 
decides whether or not the proposal complies with SEC rules.195 
If so, then the SEC declines to issue the no-action letter the 
company seeks. If not, then the SEC will issue such a letter:196 
(a) If the SEC refuses to issue a no-action letter, the company 
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must either include the shareholder proposal on the annual ballot 
(and thus risk it passing by a popular vote) or face lawsuits from 
both the SEC and the shareholder that carry significant 
penalties;197 (b) If the SEC issues a no-action letter, the company 
may still include the proposal on its ballot if its leadership so 
desires, or it may omit the proposal.198 If the leadership omits the 
proposal, the shareholder may sue to have the proposal included 
on the ballot during a future annual meeting.199 Some 
negotiations may also occur at this stage, perhaps to settle or 
prevent such a lawsuit, but evidence of this is less available.200 
Given this large number of steps (and filings that can span hundreds 
of pages), shareholder proposals can cause publicly-traded companies a 
non-trivial amount of hassle.201 This hassle would be especially 
pronounced for smaller companies with low market capitalization that 
must rely on general counsel or hire expensive outside counsel to deal with 
suboptimal proposals.202 A larger portion of a small company’s revenues 
may have to be devoted to lawyer fees to oppose the proposal.203 
Moreover, if we assume that company leadership has at least some 
incentive to lead the company to prosperity, then we can infer that 
opposition to shareholder proposals denotes executives’ beliefs that the 
proposal would harm the company if passed.204 Furthermore, the existence 
of a potential proposal that can drastically alter the way a company does 
business results in a heightened possibility of significant and extreme 
change.205 This change increases uncertainty around the company, has the 
potential to interfere with the contracts available to the company, may 
interfere with the ability to raise capital, and generally reduces the price 
that market traders are willing to pay for shares in the company (thus 
harming the net worth of the remaining shareholders that had nothing to 
do with the proposal whatsoever).206 
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Currently, there are many SEC regulations that could exclude a 
proposal. For example, this could happen if the proposal’s length exceeds 
500 words, if the proposal is a second or subsequent submission for vote 
at the same shareholder meeting, or if the proposal fails to comply with 
the other requirements under Rule 14a-8. However, nothing in the 
regulations requires the individual submitting the proposal to be acting in 
good faith (or otherwise demonstrating loyalty or care) toward the 
corporation.207 Thus, it is apparently legal to submit a proposal with full 
knowledge that the proposal would harm the market price of company 
stock.208 Because shareholder proposals lack a good faith requirement, the 
executive team, members of the board, and other shareholders have little 
recourse against a troublemaking proponent.209 The SEC has recently 
adopted several amendments to Rule 14a-8, which purport to make the 
exploitation of the shareholder proposal more difficult.210 Nevertheless, 
none of these amendments would seriously hamper stock price 
manipulation through the filing of proposals intended to harm a publicly 
traded company. 
In November of 2019, momentum for changing shareholder proposal 
rules escalated when the SEC proposed amendments to modernize Rule 
14a-8.211 The proposed amendments would: (i) increase the ownership 
requirements that a shareholder must satisfy to be eligible for filing a 
proposal;212 (ii) update the current “one proposal” rule to clarify that a 
single person cannot submit more than one shareholder proposal at the 
same shareholders’ meeting, regardless of whether the person submits a 
proposal as a shareholder or as a shareholder representative; and (iii) 
modernize the levels of shareholder support a proposal must receive to be 
eligible for resubmission of the proposal at the company’s future 
shareholder meetings.213 Although discussion of these rules, and their 
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adoption in September of 2020, is a step in the right direction,214 it does 
little to quell the possibility of the actions described below. 
D. Room for Exploitation 
The rules noted above leave ample room for abuse.215 As suggested 
in this Article’s introduction, it is entirely possible for individuals to take 
a small $2,000 position in a company, wait the appropriate amount of time 
to qualify for making a shareholder proposal, take a $1,000,000 short 
position in the company through another brokerage, and then send 
proposals that would harm the business. It may not be advisable for 
investors hoping to grow their portfolio from market gains to hold the 
same long and short positions, but it might be ideal for someone seeking 
to manipulate the market.216 It is true that the individual must certify 
ownership of at least $2,000 in company stock to be eligible for making 
shareholder proposals, but the requirement is not a net requirement: the 
shareholder need only disclose their ownership of $2,000 at the brokerage 
where the shareholder holds the long position.217 There is no requirement 
to disclose the short positions.218 
Moreover, it may not even be necessary to open two separate 
brokerage accounts.219 It is quite possible to construct a long and short 
position in the same company within the same brokerage and still avoid 
reducing one’s share of company stock below $2,000.220 The availability 
of options trading makes this possible.221 All an investor must do is sell 
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call options on the stock.222 If the investor does not own any call  
options on the stock, they can simply write the call options and sell them, 
binding themselves to the contract these options imply; at the choice of the 
buyer, the writer of the call option shall provide to the buyer 100 shares  
of stock at the agreed strike price,223 if the buyer exercises the option prior 
to expiration.224 
Furthermore, there is nothing requiring that these call options be 
covered by existing shares, even if the seller of the option is selling options 
they wrote and did not buy from another trader.225 That is, an individual 
could hold only 100 shares of a $20-per-share company and yet sell call 
options on 1,000 or 1,000,000 shares they do not own (depending on the 
limitations of the brokerage and the available leverage in the investor’s 
account).226 If the shareholder can then manipulate the stock price to fall 
after selling these options, the options lose value, and the shareholder can 
cover their position and walk away with the profit.227 In the alternative, if 
the shareholder has great faith in their ability to manipulate the price of the 
stock, the individual can simply wait until the option expires out of the 
money, walking away with the entirety of the proceeds from selling the 
option without spending the money to cover228 the position. 
This trade is not without risks, of course. Because writing a naked 
call option,229 as described, above requires the writer to furnish shares of 
stock they do not own, writing such an option exposes the trader to 
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potentially infinite liability (because the price of the stock can theoretically 
grow infinitely above the option strike-price in the time remaining prior to 
the option’s expiration).230 However, a trader who has the ability to 
manipulate the stock price of the security they short may have a reduced 
risk of this happening, thereby gaining an unfair trading advantage.231 
Shorting the security can be accomplished through purchasing 
options as well as selling them.232 Put options, which give the holder the 
right (but not the obligation) to purchase a security at the strike price, 
prove crucial in this arrangement.233 A clever trader who can anticipate a 
stock drop would purchase put options that would cover the stock they 
own or perhaps stock they do not own.234 In this way, the shareholder can 
ensure that they can sell the stock at a price above that which the 
shareholder anticipates in the future.235 This strategy is valuable for the 
sale of the securities the shareholder may have used to file a damaging 
shareholder proposal in the first place.236 Any option contracts covering 
shares that the shareholder does not own can be sold for a profit to other 
shareholders in need of them.237 If no other traders need them (although 
there are almost always those who do), the investor can simply purchase 
additional shares of the stock below the strike price of the put option and 
sell them at the strike price using their remaining put option contracts.238 
Then, the shareholder collects the difference between the purchase price 
of the shares and the strike price of the put option as profit.239 
The recent SEC rules can taper down potential stock manipulation 
activity but not by much. Recall that $2,000 now entitles the holder to a 
proposal once they have held the securities for three years rather than just 
one.240 However, marginally greater positions in the same security permit 
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the shareholder to exercise their right to file proposals just as before.241 For 
example, holding $25,000 in the security permits the submission of a 
shareholder proposal after just one year of ownership.242 A middle ground 
exists at $15,000, where two years of ownership constitute the litmus test 
for having a sufficient stake in the company.243 These new requirements 
will hardly decrease the possibility of stock manipulation by the big 
players: hedge funds, investment funds, mutual funds, foundations, trust 
funds, and other large investment vehicles often hold well over $25,000 in 
a wide variety of securities (if not all securities available on the American 
exchanges). Meeting the threshold necessary might only pose problems 
for the retail investors, and if a retail investor has less than $25,000 to 
invest, it is entirely possible they are in no position to profitably short the 
security anyway. In summary, the SEC rule change might reduce the 
problem of pesky shareholder proposals from retail investors with little 
stake in the company, but it does nothing to thwart or eliminate the 
potential for stock price manipulation by those actually equipped to do it. 
Some may argue that obvious stock manipulation by deliberately 
poor proposals may breach a fiduciary duty to other investors to not 
deliberately devalue the company.244 The law regarding this potential is 
highly amorphous and perhaps still waiting to form: We are aware of no 
fiduciary duty currently extended to minority shareholders in a  
non-merger context. While a case might be made for negligence, breach 
of fiduciary duty, or other tort, the slow process245 of the courts—which 
take years if not decades to decide such matters—fails to compare to the 
fast profit made from a well-timed trade (which can occur in less than one 
second). Moreover, there are strong indications that most jurisdictions 
would not impose such a duty on investors to begin with, meaning that 
devaluing one’s own company may seem unwise, but it is not illegal.246 
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In other areas of law, such as criminal enforcement of security laws, 
corporations will find little respite from shareholders with ill intent.247 The 
SEC does frequently enforce laws against insider trading, market 
manipulation through false information, and similar offenses.248 However, 
shareholders crippling their own companies, while seemingly nefarious, 
does not currently fit into the SEC’s enforcement scheme mainly focused 
on insider trading and fraud regulation; bad shareholder proposals are not 
illegal. After all, nothing about submitting a shareholder proposal involves 
fraud: the proponent is not stating a falsehood about anything, but rather 
merely states the shareholder’s preference for how the corporation should 
be run.249 There is no requirement that the proponent certify their good 
faith or that they hold no short interests in the company.250 
In fact, since there is no law, rule, or regulation that would prevent a 
shareholder from honestly desiring their company’s demise (due to 
holding short interests or otherwise), the shareholder may make a proposal 
with the open intent of harming their company without recourse. Hence, 
there is little opportunity to commit fraud in the first place (except perhaps 
via misrepresentation and forgery regarding the number of shares the 
shareholder holds and how long they have held them).251 The shareholder 
could conceivably misrepresent their intent to hold the shares indefinitely 
into the future.252 However, not only would this lack of intent be 
notoriously hard to prove, but a poor proposal need not be accompanied 
by a future intent to sell the $2,000 interest.253 The shareholder can actually 
maintain its stake in the company (while closing the short positions for a 
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profit) in hopes of submitting future damaging proposals and profiteering 
even more in subsequent years by taking more and more short positions as 
the years pass. 
Moreover, the submission of an intentionally foul shareholder 
proposal likely cannot lead to penalties for insider trading.254 While the 
trader might know their own submission will soon become public and 
reduce the company’s stock price, this is not the type of non-public 
information that would prohibit trading the security.255 After all, to 
constitute insider trading, the individual must know of some non-public 
detail about company operations, not the upcoming publication of a 
shareholder proposal from outside the company by one of its 
shareholders.256 Submitting a proposal cannot be considered manipulation 
of markets by knowingly inducing others to trade on information that was 
not true.257 There is no truth asserted in a proposal: It is merely a 
suggestion, however misguided, about how the company should conduct 
its business.258 From a certain perspective, some might argue it should be 
legal for owners to destroy their property if they want to destroy it.259 
However, in instances where the ownership is shared and where suspect 
motives may exist for causing the destruction, potential abuses may 
become commonplace. 
II. THE DOCUMENTED IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS ON 
CORPORATIONS 
Financial and economic literature suggests a complicated 
relationship between corporate leadership, shareholders, shareholder 
proposals, and company prospects.260 Theoretical models incorporate the 
possibility that the right to make proposals may hurt shareholders by 
shifting the position of leadership toward the goals of the activists.261 This 
can happen if the shareholder proposal passes or if the leadership, which 
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has incentives to discourage proposals (and votes on them at annual 
meetings), negotiates a settlement with the proponent.262 Inevitably, such 
a settlement would move the company at least a little in the direction 
desired by the proponent.263 Such movements can occur even when they 
decrease overall shareholder wealth.264 
Empirical studies also provide examples of opportunistic behavior 
by shareholders who make various proposals,265 though not yet in the 
context of short sellers that game the system. We suspect the latter studies 
are not currently available because data on proposers shorting their own 
stock is ordinarily private and unavailable for research. Future empirical 
analysis of short selling may be forced to rely on self-reporting or 
participants opting into a study, which may not be as accurate as other 
ways of gathering data.266 However, other shareholders that would benefit 
from reducing the profits of the corporation have fearlessly engaged in 
attempts to manipulate the way corporations do business.267 
Unions often exemplify this relationship. Unions frequently hold 
securities in the companies where they represent employees to gain an 
advantage in collective bargaining negotiations.268 Because it is ordinarily 
the duty of unions to maximize employee wages and benefits, this action 
runs contrary to the company’s intent to maximize profit (and therefore to 
potentially minimize expenditures such as wages).269 These organizations 
have the necessary incentives to impact firm operations negatively by 
seeking to increase employee wages, because unions often hold stock in 
these corporations well in excess of $2,000 and often hold these securities 
well in excess of the required holding period.270 The employees, in turn, 
hope that the increase in wages will exceed whatever losses they can 
expect to suffer as a result of their shareholder activism.271 
Scholars find this precise relationship greatly increases the use of 
shareholder proposals by unions as bargaining chips in years when the 
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collective bargaining agreement must be renewed.272 These scholars have 
discovered that “in contract expiration years compared with non-
expiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by one-fifth, 
particularly proposals concerning executive compensation.”273 These 
proposals are unlikely to receive support from outside groups, but the 
average proposal still results in a negative market reaction.274 Moreover, 
the proposals are frequently withdrawn once the union achieves wage 
concessions for union workers.275 This suggests that unions file these 
proposals to impose a hardship upon the management team and essentially 
use such proposals as bargaining chips at the negotiation table.276 Few 
would argue that these types of exploitative tactics improve shareholder 
returns, and yet they are still legal despite a detrimental impact (or at least 
a potential impact) on the stock price.277 A similar outcome can be 
achieved far more frequently by shareholders who, instead of limiting 
themselves to filing harassing proposals in certain contract years, submit 
their proposals annually to dozens of companies while shorting their stock. 
This is precisely the type of damaging, counterproductive result that the 
SEC should seek to prevent. 
As scholars dug deeper into shareholder proposals, they began to 
look at all shareholder proposals, not just those filed by unions.278 
Surveying proposals from 2007 through 2018, they found that the market 
reacted positively when the SEC allowed exclusion.279 This suggests that 
the market generally viewed proposals as potentially harming corporations 
rather than helping them, which is entirely consistent with investors’ relief 
when the SEC permits setting such proposals aside before they even have 
the chance of passing by a majority vote.280 Moreover, it is possible that 
the stock price would have risen sooner (and perhaps higher) if the 
proposal had never been made in the first place. 
Of course, this can be true without anyone shorting the company and 
filing nefarious proposals; it is entirely possible, and perhaps even likely, 
that the executives have greater knowledge about optimal firm 
management than those shareholders themselves. Then, the exclusion of 
shareholder proposals might be viewed positively by the market even if 
the proposals are well-meaning (but generally misguided). The potential 
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negative effect that news of proposals has on stock price might become 
even worse if the rules do not exclude individuals filing shareholder 
proposals specifically to reduce stock price. The fact that current SEC 
rules illegalize a significant amount of potentially harmless activity but do 
not illegalize this type of misconduct appears to be an oversight. 
Financial research further indicates that particular kinds of 
shareholder proposals tend to do the most damage.281 Investor skepticism 
seems to be highest regarding proposals concerning corporate governance 
and proposals affecting already highly profitable firms.282 The former 
might be a reaction to the fact that investors believe corporate governance 
at most firms is more optimum than whatever measures shareholders 
propose. Shareholder proposals seeking to change the way highly 
profitable firms operate may risk “killing the goose that laid the golden 
egg.” According to financial scholars, shareholders appear to have fewer 
concerns that bad proposals will pass and more fear that considering the 
proposals and negotiating with the proponents will distract managers from 
their task of maximizing shareholder wealth.283 After all, if management 
is properly motivated to avoid wasting company resources and decreasing 
firm value, then managers would necessarily need to address these 
proposals rather than risking their passage.284 
Some academic dispute does exist with respect to whether 
shareholder activism is a positive thing in its current form and whether it 
should be expanded rather than curtailed.285 For example, Professor 
Bebchuk has argued forcefully that shareholders do not have enough 
power.286 He presents empirical evidence showing that shareholders, 
despite holding shares of the company, ordinarily lack the necessary power 
to affect corporate change.287 Professor Bebchuk suggests this should lead 
to granting shareholders additional voting powers, such as the right to 
initiate and adopt “rules-of-the-game” decisions to alter the company’s 
charter or even the state of incorporation.288 Crucial to this argument is 
Professor Bebchuk’s point that merely voting for directors that could, 
theoretically, initiate these changes on shareholders’ behalf proves 
insufficient in practice to actually change the path of the corporation.289 
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Nevertheless, Professor Bebchuk’s analysis seems silent with respect 
to shareholder activism intended to actually hurt the company.290 The 
article appears to avoid consideration of what would happen if some 
shareholders formulated a nefarious intent.291 Nor can the article rely on 
the more recent research on shareholder proposals we cite above, because 
Professor Bebchuk published his article almost fifteen years prior to 
publication of this research.292 Therefore, it may be possible that some of 
the conclusions he reached require reconsideration in light of new findings 
that shareholder democracy may decrease the value of the corporation.293 
Earlier economic and financial research about the value of 
shareholder proposals does exist, which may appear contrary to the more 
recent studies.294 For example, proposals that pass by a close margin result 
in positive abnormal returns to the tune of 2.8%, with larger returns in 
firms with anti-takeover provisions.295 Higher institutional ownership and 
stronger investor activism are also associated with an increased return for 
the shareholders.296 A recent literature review found that activism 
associated with adopting certain characteristics of corporate takeovers, 
like significant stockholdings, is associated with positive changes in share 
values and firm operating performance.297 Other activism seems to have 
little effect on firm value.298 This research may suggest that activism has 
actually become more value-increasing for firms over time.299 This result 
may be consistent with prior theoretical work suggesting the importance 
of shareholder activism in order to keep rogue managers in line.300 
Moreover, it may be a sign of businesses and their shareholders copying 
effective strategies from others.301 
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However, the existence of such arguments regarding the benefits of 
shareholder proposals does not constitute a strong case against tighter 
regulation of those who make proposals.302 For example, studies that 
suggest closely-contested shareholder proposals that ultimately pass are 
helpful but cannot say very much about the shareholder proposals that 
might be filed by individuals seeking to short the stock with no intent to 
generate a close vote at the shareholder meetings.303 After all, almost by 
definition, intentionally poor proposals would not receive very much 
support at the meeting because (presumably) most of the shareholders 
wish their company would succeed.304 Therefore, studies that only observe 
the effect of closely contested proposals do not negate the need for tighter 
controls on ill-motivated parties, because these studies do not observe the 
effect of all proposals, only the effect of proposals that pass.305 
Similarly, literature reviews that draw conclusions about passed 
activist measures are less helpful in evaluating the economic and financial 
benefit of all proposals because few proposals pass or even make it to a 
vote.306 Therefore, more recent research that focuses specifically on the 
proposals themselves should prove more useful in determining whether 
nefarious actors can harm a corporation when they file a proposal that does 
not and will not receive much support.307 However, we should note that 
even if there was serious academic debate about the costs and benefits of 
filing shareholder proposals, this would not eliminate the possibility that 
nefarious actors enter and manipulate the system in its current state. Even 
studies suggesting that shareholder proposals are generally helpful to firm 
value would have to square with the fact that a purposely harmful proposal 
breaks with the general trend by creating the possibility that the 
corporation takes a wrong step. There is no scholarship of which we are 
aware that claims intentionally harmful proposals somehow increases firm 
value. Additionally, no literature suggests that additional ownership and 
disclosure requirements would decrease the value of shareholder proposals 
to the firm. Hence, additional regulation would have few downsides, but 
could potentially anticipate and prevent a stock manipulation catastrophe 
for firms particularly susceptible to suffer declines after receiving a 
shareholder proposal. 
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III. PROPOSED REGULATION 
At this point, we hope to have convinced the reader that a significant 
gap in SEC rules regarding shareholder proposals exists.308 We have 
engaged in a lengthy survey of rules that might govern the conduct of  
ill-motivated minority shareholders, yet we could not isolate a single rule 
that would prohibit it. Ill-motivated short sellers and other affiliated parties 
could easily submit shareholder proposals that lower stock value and then 
reap profits from their misconduct.309 What, then, could be done about it? 
We propose two additional rules that the SEC, Congress, or the states 
(particularly Delaware) might adopt that would prevent the exploitation of 
the shareholder proposal system. 
First, we would require that shareholders certify and prove that they 
hold no short positions in the firm to which they submit a shareholder 
proposal. This would also include certifying (but not proving) that family 
members, close friends, and business associates do not possess a short 
interest. Second, we suggest that the SEC adopt a requirement that the 
proponent of a proposal certify that they make the proposal in good faith. 
Good faith naturally excludes proposals made for the purpose of extorting 
concessions from a firm, attempted stock price manipulation, and other 
nefarious purposes (such as filing proposals due to a personal dislike  
of the leadership team). Whether the SEC, Congress, or the states 
promulgate these rules, shareholders who fabricate documents or make 
false representations in meeting these requirements should be held 
accountable as strictly as individuals who engage in insider trading or 
stock price manipulation. 
A. Prohibiting Proposals from Short Sellers 
Although short selling is part and parcel of the American stock 
market,310 it is not viewed as favorably in other jurisdictions. For example, 
many exchanges abroad do not permit short selling of any kind.311 
Furthermore, numerous European jurisdictions, including France, Italy, 
Spain, Greece, and Belgium, have enacted short sale bans in an attempt to 
stabilize financial markets and improve investor confidence in the wake of 
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the COVID-19 pandemic.312 The common justification for permitting 
short-sale transactions in the United States is that it provides flexibility 
and profitability not otherwise available to investors. For example,  
the existence of call or put options permits traders to take time-sensitive 
positions that would otherwise be unavailable to investors in common 
stocks, bonds, or other securities.313 This justification alone, even 
unaccompanied by the idea that the United States is a country that  
values the freedom of contract, seems sufficient to permit the practice.314 
That said, it is important to restrict short sellers from engaging in  
certain activities.315 
The regulation we suggest, implemented via the SEC, Congressional 
act, or state law, would prevent individuals with short interests in a 
company from filing shareholder proposals. This regulation, if properly 
enforced, would almost entirely eliminate the problem we have discussed 
in the pages above. If the trouble with permitting almost anyone to file 
shareholder proposals is that short sellers may use them to reduce share 
value, then a direct ban on these types of proposals from short sellers 
should do the trick. After all, the potential for exploitation is rather 
obvious, and this remedy would be tailored to the problem it seeks to 
address. The short seller would not lose the value of its long or short 
positions except to the extent that the seller values its right to make 
shareholder proposals. The short seller would still be able to attend annual 
meetings, cast votes on proposals submitted by others, cast votes on the 
membership of the board of directors, and exercise residual claimholder 
rights that accompany the holding of any amount of equity.316 
Like all rules, this one is not entirely costless to the regulated: the 
short sellers who hold equity interest in a company would partially lose 
the ability to influence that company. However, this is not a permanent 
loss. It would not be difficult for short sellers to simply close out their 
short positions in a particular firm if they wish to take part in the 
shareholder proposal process. We suggest giving ample warning that this 
rule will apply from a certain date, so all but the most extreme short sellers 
will be able to adjust their portfolios accordingly if they deem that 
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advantageous. This change might make short selling marginally more 
disadvantageous, but it would improve the lot of those holding long 
positions in the stock and of the corporation’s leadership team. By 
eliminating the possibility that short sellers use shareholder proposals to 
hurt the firm, the risks associated with the stock would fall, resulting in a 
rise in price. Moreover, management would save a significant amount of 
their time and legal costs from dealing with potentially harmful proposals, 
possibly raising company prospects in the eyes of the market.317 
A regulation that eliminates a potentially profitable short selling 
activity will likely face challenges and attempts by parties to circumvent 
the regulation. For example, individuals may file nefarious shareholder 
proposals with firms where they hold no shorts but where their family 
members, friends, and/or business associates hold a short position. Hence, 
the regulation should be worded strongly to also prohibit this type of 
proposal activity. In fact, a proposal meant to benefit any short position 
within the company should be prohibited and potentially punished with 
criminal and civil penalties. Otherwise, individuals could sabotage firms 
on behalf of others. 
These suggestions will, undoubtedly, raise the issue of enforcement. 
Regulators can take several steps to detect misconduct via shareholder 
proposal and curtail such activity. For example, just as investors must 
certify and provide proof of holding at least $2,000 in company shares for 
at least three years, investors could be required to certify that they hold no 
short interest in the corporation whose governance or operations they seek 
to change. This certification would subject individuals who misrepresent 
their positions to fraud charges if they fail to make the proper disclosures. 
Moreover, brokerages that provide confirmation of the $2,000 three-year 
holding requirement can be required to certify that the investor has 
accurately stated they hold no short positions in the company.318 This 
requirement would allow additional oversight to ensure accuracy. 
Of course, as mentioned earlier, an investor who wanted to avoid 
detection as a short seller could simply short the security from a different 
brokerage account. A second brokerage account means additional  
fees—imposing costs to the misconduct that have nothing to do with 
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enforcement.319 Most (if not all) brokerages impose a leverage limit on 
individuals shorting stocks.320 A short position, after all, is a position 
where the investor borrows a security or an option, instead of money, and 
sells it at the market price.321 In return, the investor holds the money 
obtained from the transaction in hopes of repurchasing the asset they sold 
at a lower price and returning the borrowed asset to the lender.322 This type 
of transaction requires a loan, which ordinarily carries interest charges.323 
Moreover, and more importantly, brokerages set limits to prevent 
investors from taking more risk than they can afford to take.324 
These leverage limits protect the brokers and the investors because 
without them the investor would potentially incur limitless liability due to 
poor bets.325 When the investor is unable to pay and declares bankruptcy, 
the burden would fall to the brokerage.326 When the brokerage is unable to 
pay and declares bankruptcy, other investors with this brokerage might 
lose their money.327 If taken to the extreme, with many investors partaking 
in the irresponsible behavior, the activity risks a liquidity crisis—which is 
often at the heart of many financial collapses and economic recessions and 
depressions.328 That scenario is precisely the rationale for limits on 
borrowing to short assets; limits ordinarily based on the amount of assets 
an investor holds in a particular account.329 
The greater the value of assets in one account, the more room the 
investor has to borrow under the margin requirements.330 Therefore, 
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splitting accounts just to short a particular security, while simultaneously 
filing proposals intended to harm that security, adds additional cost to the 
nefarious activity. If the investor is diversified in their investments and 
strategy, they would need to maintain a separate $2,000 account for every 
stock they wish to harm by way of proposal while shorting that stock in a 
different account.331 Eventually, this would become so cumbersome that 
the small market declines in stock price may not be worth shorting for 
some investors, even if they could create those declines through nefarious 
shareholder proposals.332 Therefore, adding the requirement that each 
brokerage certify the investor’s eligibility to make shareholder proposals 
based on short positions would hamper at least the marginal stock 
manipulator from engaging in the activity. Some individuals might simply 
create a large number of $2,000 accounts for the express purpose of 
shareholder proposals, but this regulation cannot hope to stop all 
misconduct.333 The existence of such accounts, however, could serve as 
strong circumstantial evidence that the shareholder is misbehaving. 
Shareholder intent may be difficult to prove and, even with the aid 
of search warrants, private accounts may be difficult for investigators to 
access. Thus, opponents might suggest that this rule would only serve to 
chill the legitimate exercise of shareholder rights without dissuading the 
individuals actually gaming the system.334 Whether it would truly chill the 
exercise of shareholder rights might be a difficult argument to advance, 
because so few shareholders exercise this right even without the 
restriction—the SEC typically receives only a few hundred filings per year 
seeking a no-action letter regarding a shareholder proposal.335 This number 
should be compared to the tens, if not hundreds of millions, of individuals 
who might otherwise qualify to file shareholder proposals due to their 
long-standing ownership of at least $2,000 in a particular stock.  
Hence, policymakers should not concern themselves with chilling a right 
so rarely exercised.336 
 
 331. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). 
 332. Shareholders are limited to only one proposal per annual shareholder meeting. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Ganesh Setty, Shareholders Would Have Tougher Time Submitting Resolutions Under 
SEC’s Proposed Rule, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/05/rule-change-would-
make-it-harder-to-submit-shareholder-resolutions.html [https://perma.cc/P3S3-GH6R]. 
 335. SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2015 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2016 
No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters, 
supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note 
160. 
 336. SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2015 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2016 
No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters, 
supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note 
160. 
2021] Alarming Legality of Security Manipulation 751 
The lack-of-detection argument remains, however, and it is one that 
can be raised against almost every criminal or civil law or regulation. 
Enforcement is difficult work, and it would be hard to determine the 
number of culprits that actually escape the clutches of enforcers.337 After 
all, not only is it difficult to know whether an offense has been committed, 
but it is difficult to ascertain the number of people involved. We cannot 
even formulate a detection rate for virtually any white-collar crime 
because we can never know the denominator of that equation.  
Similarities exist between provisions barring stock price manipulation 
through shareholder proposals and crimes like insider trading and  
stock manipulation.338 Perhaps we should at least attempt to enforce  
these regulations intended to reduce instances of traders “burning” their 
own property for the “insurance” money they would receive on account of 
their shorts. 
With respect to insider trading, we are confident that it occurs more 
often than it is reported, and finance scholars often write papers about its 
likelihood in various instances.339 However, in many cases, insufficient 
proof of misconduct exists resulting in few arrests.340 This will probably 
be true with stock manipulation through shareholder proposals. 
Nonetheless, the existence of a regulation or statute against it on the books 
will give regulators the power to seek evidence, obtain search warrants, 
and prosecute individuals who brazenly violate the rules of the 
marketplace. If nothing else, at least this regulation would eliminate open 
exploitation of the process. 
B. Adding a “Good Faith” Requirement 
We propose shareholders be held to a good faith requirement. It 
would be a step in the right direction if we illegalized short selling a 
security while simultaneously sending in shareholder proposals, thus 
reducing the possibility of stock manipulation. However, unscrupulous 
traders may find other reasons to lower the price of a company that is 
unconnected to shortselling. Companies may be sabotaged by shareholder 
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investors in exchange for collective bargaining agreements, to advance an 
agenda entirely incompatible with company policies, and/or to harm a 
company incompatible with a particular ideology.341 The existence of 
these possibilities creates the need for a good faith requirement that, if not 
met, should lead to the exclusion of a particular proposal from the ballot 
at the annual meeting. This would, at the very least, prevent short sellers 
from citing as an excuse some alternative motive other than the deliberate 
attempt to devalue the stock. 
It is true that good-faith requirements are notoriously difficult to nail 
down.342 The definition of “good faith” is frequently an open question for 
scholars and practitioners. Some definitions contain contradictory terms, 
while others omit terms that might properly be included, and others say 
more about the phrase than necessary.343 We would adopt the following 
definition: honesty and the absence of any intent to defraud, harm, or act 
maliciously toward the corporation, its management, or any of its 
shareholders. This does not greatly vary from the definition of good faith 
already employed in corporate law.344 
Of course, the existence of this definition still leaves some questions 
about what the term means when applied to shareholder proposals. Hence, 
we suggest that violations of this requirement not result in any criminal 
prosecution. Instead, companies can request a no-action letter based on a 
lack of good faith, and the SEC can issue no-action letters with respect to 
proposals found, by a preponderance of evidence, to be in bad faith. This 
would still leave the shareholder the option of litigating the matter in civil 
court, if the shareholder believes otherwise, while protecting the company 
from having to spend time dealing with clearly harmful proposals on the 
day of the shareholder meeting.345 
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A civil recovery against the bad faith shareholder proponent should 
be available, which the company would be able to raise as either a cause 
of action or a counterclaim in the event of a shareholder lawsuit.  
After all, nefarious actors deliberately attempting to damage the 
governance of a company is a real threat, whether they do so out of a desire 
to profit from short selling or otherwise.346 This cause of action would 
create at least some deterrence for shareholders who do not act blatantly 
enough to be criminally responsible but who do not have the corporations’ 
best interests in mind.347 
Permitting a corporation to sue the shareholder on the grounds of bad 
faith would be a major step away from current corporate law. However, 
the shareholder burden to avoid liability is low: All the shareholder has to 
do is file a claim in good faith, or at the very least, not in bad faith. The 
corporation would have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the 
shareholder acted in bad faith, and we suggest a heightened burden above 
the “preponderance of the evidence” standard typically used in civil 
proceedings.348 Given the need to protect shareholder rights, it should be 
necessary that the company show by “clear and convincing evidence” that 
the proponent of a proposal acted in bad faith.349 
This suggestion raises the bar from what would be necessary to prove 
to the SEC that a proposal should be excluded. Right now, the SEC need 
only be convinced of the lack of good faith by a preponderance of the 
evidence.350 In an action for damages against the activist shareholder, the 
plaintiff corporation would have to establish bad faith by clear and 
convincing evidence. This would greatly increase the corporation’s burden 
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of proof and hopefully remove any fear felt by shareholders of the 
possibility that they may be sued for nefarious shareholder conduct. 
Therefore, many shareholder proposals might be properly excluded by the 
SEC for lack of good faith without precluding bad faith litigation and 
without guaranteeing that the shareholder would be liable. An additional 
fees provision could be imposed upon the corporation if it loses:  
In the event the corporation brings such litigation against a shareholder but 
does not prevail, the shareholder’s costs and attorney’s fees should be paid 
by the corporation. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has surveyed the various rights and duties of 
shareholders, board members, and corporate executives with respect to 
shareholder proposals and has identified a loophole in the rules that 
permits stock price manipulation.351 Current regulations permit 
shareholders to short the very corporations to which they submit 
shareholder proposals.352 This loophole allows bad faith actors to 
potentially influence the corporation’s governance and the way markets 
perceive the corporation’s future prospects.353 Because economic and 
financial studies indicate shareholder proposals may be harmful to 
corporations, we suggest at least two additional rules.354 
First, we suggest that individuals certify and partially prove that 
neither they nor their relatives, business affiliates, or close friends hold (to 
the shareholder’s knowledge) a short interest in the corporation. Failure to 
follow this rule should be subject to criminal, civil, and perhaps even 
administrative penalties, similar to how the SEC and other federal agencies 
currently handle cases of insider trading and security manipulation.355 
Second, proposals filed by shareholders must be filed in good faith. This 
rule, which would be accompanied by only a civil penalty (assuming the 
company can establish a violation under a heightened burden of proof), 
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would serve as a catch-all provision to exclude proposals from annual 
shareholder meetings that might be intended to harm the company.  
Adding these rules by statute or regulation should secure stocks from 
manipulation by shareholder proposals and perhaps help market outcomes 
for all participants. 
Undoubtedly, the rules we propose are not perfect and would not 
prevent all shareholder misconduct with respect to proposals. 
Nevertheless, the current gap in SEC regulation of malicious proposals 
leaves more to be desired. Even though the SEC is apparently aware of 
this problem, the recently implemented measures do not address the 
problems that unrestrained shareholder proposals pose for companies.356 
Therefore, policymakers should consider additional steps to resolve the 
conflict. The rules we suggest above could be helpful in preventing stock 
price manipulation and ensuring that a small minority of shareholders in a 
given corporation do not use their activism to harm the other shareholders 
and the company as a whole. 
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